The illusion of academic freedom

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The Illusion of Pure Academic Freedom

Academic freedom has become a buzzword in the modern academy, embraced by individuals across the political spectrum. Whether on the right, where it is used to counter "cancellation," or on the left, where it is invoked in response to the criticism of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, the concept of academic freedom is now more popular than ever. However, this widespread appeal often masks a deeper truth: the invocation of academic freedom is typically motivated by self-interest rather than a genuine commitment to intellectual openness.

For conservatives, the narrative of being silenced by "wokeness" has shifted toward demanding that elite institutions adopt a specific worldview. Meanwhile, institutions like Harvard, which once embraced "cancel culture," now frame academic freedom as a shield against government interference. This suggests that both sides are less concerned with protecting free expression and more focused on safeguarding their own ideological positions.

Some argue that the highest form of intellectual integrity lies in an unwavering commitment to academic freedom, regardless of the views being expressed. This position echoes Voltaire’s famous statement: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” Yet, this stance is not only flawed—it fails to recognize that not all perspectives should be tolerated, such as those that justify slavery or racial superiority. Moreover, no human institution can truly operate on a neutral and nonjudgmental basis. Even the commitment to free speech carries foundational beliefs that require prior agreement.

The current debates surrounding "academic freedom" obscure a fundamental reality: there is no pure domain of free expression. As humans, we constantly negotiate the boundaries of freedom within our communities. Honest and productive discussions require us to acknowledge our actual commitments rather than pretending to hold neutral stances. This honesty is especially important in academic settings today.

Three Propositions on Academic Freedom

To better understand the complexities of academic freedom, three key propositions emerge:

  1. There is no such thing as pure academic freedom.
    All forms of academic freedom are shaped by the context in which they exist. They are not absolute but are instead influenced by the values and priorities of the institutions that uphold them.

  2. Those who claim pure academic freedom often seek to place liberal principles beyond debate.
    By framing academic freedom as a universal ideal, proponents may attempt to silence alternative viewpoints, reinforcing a particular ideological framework without acknowledging its limitations.

  3. Academic freedom exists, but it is always bounded and contested.
    While freedom of expression is essential, it is never limitless. Institutions draw lines around acceptable discourse, and these lines are often shaped by the values of the community itself.

Human institutions, including universities, are inherently complex and dynamic. They establish boundaries for acceptable contestation, and certain stances are deemed out of bounds. There is no easy solution to these challenges, but understanding the nature of these boundaries is crucial for meaningful dialogue.

The Liberal Roots of Free Speech

The concept of free speech and academic freedom has its origins in the efforts of early modern liberal thinkers such as John Milton, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. These philosophers sought to challenge older traditions that restricted speech, worship, and expression. Their arguments for tolerance became central to liberal philosophy.

However, this foundational narrative has faced significant challenges over time. In 1994, Stanley Fish, a prominent scholar, published an essay titled “There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing Too.” Fish pointed out that classical defenses of free speech often acknowledged limits to tolerance. For example, John Milton explicitly excluded Catholics from his vision of toleration, stating that they should be "extirpate[d]." Similarly, John Locke limited religious tolerance to Protestants, excluding Catholics and atheists. John Stuart Mill also imposed restrictions on free speech, arguing that some groups, such as "barbarians," needed to be guided by more progressive leaders.

Fish argued that free speech is not a limitless domain but one defined by its limitations. The way we define harm, for instance, reflects our underlying values. In recent years, terms like "microaggressions" and "safe spaces" have reshaped how we understand harm, demonstrating that even the most basic concepts are shaped by ideology.

The Role of Community in Defining Freedom

Communities always set exceptions to free expression, not as regrettable limits but as defining features of the community itself. These exclusions make shared speech possible. When a community faces behavior that threatens its core purpose, it must respond by declaring what is unacceptable. As Fish noted, this is not a sudden exception but a recognition of the original exclusions that give meaning to freedom.

This is especially true for academic institutions, which are built on deep commitments and shared exclusions. The purpose of a university is not merely to encourage free expression but to pursue knowledge in a structured and meaningful way. Free expression, while valuable, is secondary to the institution's primary mission. At times, it may even pose a threat to that mission, requiring regulation to prevent the institution from sacrificing its identity.

Early Critics and Campus Debates

The idea that academic freedom rests on a foundation of exclusion has been known for some time. Religious critics, particularly Catholic conservatives, were among the first to question the liberal vision of academic freedom. In the mid-20th century, figures like Edward Rooney, S.J., warned that the push for academic freedom was part of a broader effort to secularize educational institutions.

Rooney argued that the liberal interpretation of academic freedom threatened the very identity of religious institutions. He cited the Humanist Manifesto of 1933, which promoted a vision of education focused on the "fulfillment of human life." This vision, he believed, would eventually replace traditional religious values with a new form of orthodoxy.

Robert MacIver, a professor at Columbia University, furthered this argument by advocating for the elimination of religious influence in secular institutions. He claimed that universities should focus on the free pursuit of knowledge, regardless of its implications. However, this vision did not account for the consequences of replacing established truths with new ones.

A Modern Conservative Defense

Today, conservative voices, such as Robert George of Princeton University, are calling for the protection of academic freedom. George argues that traditional ideals of free expression have been compromised by demands for language and thought policing. His concerns reflect a broader shift in the conservative movement, which now seeks to defend its values against what it perceives as growing censorship.

However, the irony is that many of the same institutions that once championed liberal forms of academic freedom have become bastions of progressive ideology. This transformation has led to a reevaluation of what constitutes acceptable discourse, with some arguing that certain viewpoints—such as those critical of DEI programs—are now being suppressed.

The Limits of Campus Openness

While academic freedom is important, it is not absolute. Universities are unique communities with specific missions and values. They select faculty, staff, and students based on shared commitments, and these selections shape the boundaries of acceptable discourse. While some communities, such as Christian institutions, explicitly base their selection criteria on faith, others do so implicitly through admissions processes, hiring practices, and scholarly standards.

The reality is that every community draws lines, even if those lines are not always visible. The practice of academic freedom is always secondary to the question of what kind of community we seek to build. This is evident in the way even free-speech absolutists today support policies that limit certain types of speech, such as antisemitic protests or expressions of racial superiority.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the idea of pure academic freedom is a myth. The current period of reevaluation of liberal institutions involves political contestation at both the academic and national levels. While the appeal to academic freedom is often used to mask underlying ideological commitments, the truth is that all forms of freedom are shaped by the values and priorities of the communities that uphold them.

As we navigate this complex landscape, it is essential to be honest about the exclusions that define the domains in which freedom is lived. Rather than retreating behind a veil of false neutrality, we should focus on the substance and limits of what our communities deem acceptable. This examination, while fraught with potential risks, is necessary for a more authentic and meaningful pursuit of truth.

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